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ARTICLES
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN
COMPLETION OF COMMERCIAL
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS: ARE THEY
RECOVERABLE BY THE OWNER WHEN THE
OWNER CONTRIBUTES TO THE DELAY?.
Rocky Unruh*
John Worden**
I. INTRODUCTION
As those who litigate construction cases can attest, it is
frequently difficult and costly to determine the actual dam-
ages sustained by an owner when its commercial construction
project is completed late. For this reason, commercial con-
struction contracts often contain a provision for liquidated
damages in the event of a delay in completion of construction.
Typically, these provisions require the general contractor to
pay a predetermined amount of damages to the owner - usu-
ally calculated on a "per diem" basis - if the contractor fails
to complete the project by the agreed-upon date.'
If the general contractor or its subcontractors are the
sole cause of the delay, then enforcement of the typical liqui-
dated damages clause is simple: The number of days of delay
* Partner, Morgenstein & Jubelirer, San Francisco, California; J.D.
(magna cum laude) 1978, University of Michigan; B.A. (with distinction) 1974,
University of Kansas.
** Associate, Morgenstein & Jubelirer, San Francisco, California; J.D.
(magna cum laude) 1989, University of Puget Sound; B.A. (cum laude) 1986,
Seattle University.
1. The type of liquidated damages clause whereby a specific amount of liq-
uidated damages is awarded for each day of delay is commonly referred to as a
"per diem" liquidated damages clause. For example, a typical per diem liqui-
dated damages provision might provide that the general contractor pay the
owner/developer $10,000 for each calendar day that construction is ultimately
completed behind schedule. See JERVIS & LEVIN, CONSTRUCTION LAW: PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICE 10 (1988).
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is multiplied by the "per diem" amount to determine the total
liquidated damages, which the owner then usually deducts
from the retention owed to the contractor. If, however, as is
more often the case, the owner or the owner's consultants
contribute to the delay in the completion, then enforcement of
the clause becomes problematic for several reasons. First,
scheduling experts for the owner and contractor typically dis-
agree over complex issues of causation and concurrency of de-
lay. For example, the parties argue over who caused how
much of the construction delay. Also, the state of the law it-
self is uncertain as to whether the owner can recover any liq-
uidated damages from the contractor, even though the con-
tractor admittedly caused some of the delay.2
This article examines the general state of California law
on the issue of liquidated damages. Specifically, the article
focuses on whether, and to what extent, liquidated damages
provisions in commercial construction contracts can be en-
forced against the contractor when the owner has contributed
to the delay in completion of construction. The article ana-
lyzes conflicting California appellate decisions in this area.
Some courts have refused altogether to award the owner liq-
uidated damages,3 while others have been willing to appor-
tion the damages based roughly on the comparative fault of
the owner and contractor.4 This article also examines se-
lected decisions on these issues from other jurisdictions, and
concludes by offering suggestions on how owners and general
contractors might avoid the existing uncertainty in the law
by carefully drafting liquidated damages provisions.
II. THE TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
Contracts for commercial construction can vary signifi-
cantly, depending on the size and nature of the project.' How-
ever, for the purpose of discussion within this article, imagine
2. Compare Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 114 P.2d 65,
70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) (refusing to award owner liquidated damages) with Jas-
per Constr., Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist., 153 Cal. Rptr. 767, 774 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (holding that owner should have been allowed to recover some
liquidated damages even though owner caused some of the delay in completion).
See also discussion infra text accompanying notes 22-37 and 148-160.
3. See Gogo, 114 P.2d at 70.
4. See London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Las Lomitas Sch. Dist., 12
Cal. Rptr. 598, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
5. See generally JERVIS & LEVIN, supra note 1.
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the following hypothetical construction project, based on a
commonly used form agreement that incorporates a provision
for per diem liquidated damages.
Assume that a real estate developer (hereinafter
"Owner") wishes to build a commercial office building on its
own property. Owner retains an architect (hereinafter "Archi-
tect") and all appropriate consultants. Owner solicits bids
from general contractors and awards the job to one such en-
tity (hereinafter "Contractor"). Owner and Contractor sign a
"Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contrac-
tor," which, as the name implies, is a form agreement au-
thored by the American Institute of Architects used com-
monly on large commercial construction projects.6 The
contract provides for a guaranteed maximum construction
cost of $60 million. The completed building will have approxi-
mately 500,000 square feet of rentable space.
Owner agrees that Architect, Owner's agent under the
contract, will ensure that all project plans, drawings, and
specifications conform to any and all applicable municipal re-
quirements. Contractor agrees that the project will take two
years to build, and that it will be "substantially complete" by
January 1, 1995. The contract defines "substantial comple-
tion" as that date on which a temporary certificate of occu-
pancy (hereinafter "TCO") for the building is obtained from
the relevant municipal bodies. If the project is not complete
by that date, the contract provides for per diem liquidated
damages as follows: "Liquidated Damages: Contractor shall
pay Owner $15,000 per day for each day that substantial
completion is delayed beyond January 1, 1995." Finally, the
Standard Form Agreement's "General Conditions" state that
the Contractor is entitled to extensions of time where "the
Contractor is delayed ... by any act of neglect of the Owner
... or by any other cause which the Architect determines may
justify the delay ....
A short time after the construction contract is signed,
Owner negotiates a favorable lease agreement with Tenant.
Anticipating that the building will be substantially complete
on January 1, 1995, Tenant agrees to lease the entire build-
ing at a rental rate of $1,500,000 per month, and is to be
6. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CON-
TRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION § 8.3.1 (1976).
7. Id.
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given possession and full access to the building beginning on
February 1, 1995, when rental payments will commence.
On October 1, 1992, with demolition and excavation com-
plete, Contractor begins construction according to the plans
and specifications provided by Architect. Construction begins
as scheduled on January 1, 1993, but does not run smoothly.
Contractor experiences a number of delays in construction for
which it is ultimately responsible, including defaults by cer-
tain of its subcontractors and delays caused by Contractor's
own failure to competently schedule the work.
It is now January 1, 1995, the date the building is to be
substantially completed. Construction is not complete due to
the various delays caused by Contractor and its
subcontractors.
On February 1, 1995, Tenant's lease with Owner is
scheduled to begin. As the building has not yet obtained a
TCO, Tenant cannot inhabit the building, and Tenant is not,
therefore, obligated to pay its $1,500,000 monthly rent.
On April 1, 1995, during final building inspections, mu-
nicipal inspectors discover that the building fails to conform
with certain municipal requirements resulting from Archi-
tect's failure to properly design the project. The city inspec-
tors order that certain substantial modifications be made
before a TCO is granted.
On July 1, 1995, Contractor finishes the modifications
necessitated by Architect's improper design. The city inspec-
tors grant a TCO. The building is now "substantially com-
plete," albeit six months late. Tenant moves in immediately
and begins paying its $1,500,000 monthly rent. The Owner
did not receive any rent for February through June, as Ten-
ant was precluded from occupying the premises during that
period of delay.
Owner files a lawsuit against Contractor for breach of
contract in order to recover damages relating to the building's
late completion. At trial, the parties and their respective ex-
perts agree on the following:
1. The building was completed 180 days after the
agreed-upon date;
2. Architect failed to design the building in compliance
with applicable municipal requirements;
3. The modifications necessitated by Architect's negli-
gent design took three months to complete;
[Vol. 34
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4. Contractor is responsible for all other delays;
5. Contractor would have substantially completed the
building only three months late had it not been for Archi-
tect's negligent design;
6. Had Architect's design been proper, the building still
could not have obtained a TCO by January 1, 1995 due to
the Contractor's delays;
7. Had Contractor timely completed its work, the build-
ing still would not have obtained a TCO on January 1,
1995 once the design inadequacies were discovered;
8. Had there been adequate design or no Contractor-
caused delays, the building would have been substan-
tially complete by January 1, 1995, and Tenant could
have begun its occupancy on February 1, 1995 as
scheduled;
9. Owner's actual damages during the delay period are
$7,500,000; and
10. The total per diem liquidated damages are
$2,700,000 (180 days x $15,000 per day).
Owner argues, however, that while it may have been re-
sponsible for some delay, the delay is irrelevant. Owner ar-
gues that Contractor contracted to finish work by January 1,
1995, and that due to Contractor's own delays the project
would have under no circumstances been substantially com-
plete by that date, notwithstanding any acts or omissions on
Owner's part.
Contractor's argument mirrors that of Owner. Contrac-
tor contends that even if its own work had run smoothly, the
Owner-caused delay would have made it impossible for a
TCO to have been granted by January 1, 1995, per the con-
tract, or even by February 1, 1995, the date on which Tenant
was to begin its tenancy. Accordingly, Contractor contends
that Owner should be precluded from recovering any dam-
ages whatsoever.
To what, therefore, is Owner entitled?
1. $2,700,000 in liquidated damages, covering the en-
tire 180 days of delay?
2. $1,350,000 in liquidated damages, based on a finding
that Owner caused fifty percent, or three months, of the
total delay in completion?
3. No liquidated damages, but all (or some portion) of
its $7,500,000 in actual damages?
1993]
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4. No liquidated or actual damages, based on a finding
that because the building could not have been substan-
tially complete by January 1, 1995, due in part to acts of
the Owner, Owner is precluded from recovering any
damages?
As will be discussed below, before 1978, Owner probably
would have been precluded from recovering any liquidated
damages due to its comparative fault, but at the same time
would have been allowed to recover all (or some portion) of its
actual damages.8 After 1978, the resolution of the issue in
this manner is no longer so assured.
III. DISCUSSION
A. California Law Governing Liquidated Damages
Clauses-California Civil Code Section 1671
In California, contractual provisions for liquidated dam-
ages have been governed by statute for more than a century.9
Before 1978, those statutes - Civil Code sections 1670 and
1671 - "expressed a strong public policy against liquidated
damages provisions,"10 declaring such provisions "void" un-
less used in cases where it was "impracticable or extremely
difficult" to determine the amount of actual damages sus-
tained as a result of the contract breach.11 As a result of this
legislative sentiment, courts were generally reluctant to en-
force liquidated damages clauses, and litigation over these
clauses usually centered on whether it was, in fact, "impracti-
8. See, e.g., Gogo v. Los Angeles Flood Control Dist., 114 P.2d 65, 70 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1941); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Board of Trustees, 35 Cal. Rptr.
765, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
9. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1670, 1671 (both of these statutes were first en-
acted in 1872).
10. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. Rptr.
332, 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
11. Former CAL. Civ. CODE § 1670 read as follows: "Every contract by which
the amount of damages to be paid, or other compensation to be made, for a
breach of an obligation, is determined in anticipation thereof, is to that extent
void, except as expressly provided in the next section." Rice v. Schmid, 115 P.2d
498, 499 (Cal. 1941) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670 (West 1985)). Former Cali-
fornia Civil Code Section 1671 read as follows: "The parties to the contract may
agree therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of
damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it
would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." Id.
(quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 1671 (West 1985)).
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cable or difficult" to fix actual damages. 12 As evidence of their
reluctance to enforce these provisions, the courts imposed
upon proponents of liquidated damages the additional burden
of proving that the parties, when negotiating the contract,
made a "reasonable endeavor" to state an amount of liqui-
dated damages that bore a "reasonable relationship" to actual
damages. 13
Effective July 1, 1978, however, section 1670 was re-
pealed and section 1671 was amended to provide, in relevant
part: "[A] provision in a contract liquidating the damages for
the breach of the contract is valid unless the party seeking to
invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was
unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time
the contract was made."' 4 With the enactment of this sec-
tion, "a new general rule favoring the enforcement of liqui-
dated damages provisions" came into being.' 5
While a number of California decisions, both before and
after 1978, have interpreted the validity of liquidated dam-
ages provisions in the context of a construction contract, only
a handful have ever attempted to delineate a standard for
awarding liquidated damages where the party seeking recov-
ery under the provision (usually the owner) is partially or
wholly responsible for the delay giving rise to the liquidated
damages. 16 Further, decisions that addressed this matter
have been anything but consistent. In Vrgora v. Los Angeles
Unified School District,17 one of the most recent cases to ad-
dress this issue, the court found "[t]here appears, at present,
to be a split of authority regarding enforcement of liquidated
damages when fault for delay can be apportioned between the
parties "1.... 8
Both the line of cases allowing apportionment of liqui-
dated damages and the line of cases refusing apportionment
12. Electrical Products Corp. v. Williams, 256 P.2d 403, 406 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1953).
13. See, e.g., Rice, 115 P.2d at 499; Electrical Products, 256 P.2d at 406.
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(b) (West 1985).
15. Id. (as quoted in Law Revision Commission Comment to 1977 amend-
ment). The new general rule did not apply only where enforcement was sought
"against a consumer in a consumer case." Id.
16. See, e.g., Nomellini Constr. Co. v. California Dep't of Water Resources,
96 Cal. Rptr. 682, 684-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Jasper Constr., Inc. v. Foothill
Junior College Dist., 153 Cal. Rptr. 767, 774-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
17. 200 Cal. Rptr. 130, 135-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
18. Id. at 135.
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continue to hold precedential, albeit suspect, value for several
reasons. First, Vrgora failed to reconcile the conflict. 19 Sec-
ond, there are numerous inconsistencies in the relevant
cases. 20 Third, the effect of section 1671's amendment re-
mains undefined.21
B. California Appellate Decisions Refusing to Apportion
Liquidated Damages Where Both Parties Are
Responsible for Delay
1. Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District
and London Guarantee v. Los Lomitas School
District: All or Nothing
The seminal case refusing apportionment of liquidated
damages is Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dis-
trict.2 2 In Gogo, a plaintiff contractor entered into a contract
with the defendant flood control district for excavation and
construction work on a dam.23 Following the completion of
construction, the district withheld liquidated damages from
its final payment to the contractor based on the contractor's
failure to complete the work in a timely manner.24 Although
the contract provided the work was to be completed within
120 days, the contractor took 369 days to finish the job.25 The
contract provided for per diem liquidated damages of fifty dol-
lars for every day of delay.26 The district withheld $12,450 for
249 days of delay. The evidence demonstrated, however,
that the first forty days of delay were caused by the district's
failure to clear the worksite to allow the contractor to begin
work, and another forty days of delay were caused by inaccu-
racies in the district's plans and specifications.2"
The district contended it was entitled to keep the liqui-
dated damages, because, even discounting the delay caused
by the district's acts, the contractor would not have completed
19. See id.
20. See generally infra text accompanying notes 96-111.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
22. 114 P.2d 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
23. Id. at 66.
24. Id. at 70.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 114 P.2d 65, 70 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1941).
28. Id.
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the job within 120 days.29 The district asked the trial court to
apportion the amount of delay attributable to each and fix
damages accordingly. 30 The trial court refused the district's
request and ordered the district to return to the contractor
the entirety of the liquidated damages withheld by the
district.3 '
The court of appeal affirmed, stating:
The correct rule is that where such delays are occasioned
by the mutual fault of the parties the court will not at-
tempt to apportion them but will refuse to enforce the pro-
vision for liquidated damages. There is no way for sum-
ming up the defaults of each and apportioning the
damages to them, but the whole must be allowed or none;
and, as all cannot be, none must be.32
The court of appeal stated that "[b]y its own act [the dis-
trict] rendered performance within the time limited by the
contract impossible and has therefore lost its right to claim
the liquidated damages provided in the contract."3
3
Gogo closely resembles the facts in our hypothetical. In
our hypothetical, Contractor completed construction after the
agreed-upon date for substantial completion, as the contrac-
tor had done in Gogo.34 Both our Contractor and the contrac-
tor in Gogo were responsible for a substantial portion of the
delay. 5 In each case, the contractor would not have timely
completed construction even discounting the delay caused by
the other party.36 Nonetheless, the court in Gogo pronounced
that where an owner is responsible for any delay, that owner
cannot recover liquidated damages.3 7 According to Gogo,
Owner in our hypothetical cannot recover any of the
$2,700,000 of liquidated damages at issue.
29. Id. at 70.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 114 P.2d 65, 70-71
(Cal. Ct. App. 1941) (quoting, in part, Champlain Constr. Co. v. O'Brien, 117 F.
271, 277 (C.C.D.Vt. 1902) (citations omitted)).
33. Id. at 71 (citing King Iron Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 43 F.
768 (C.C.D.Mo. 1890)).
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 114 P.2d 65, 71 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1941).
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The first case to comment on Gogo was London Guaran-
tee & Accident Co. v. Las Lomitas School Dist. of San Mateo
County."8 The plaintiff, London Guarantee, was the bonding
company of a defaulted contractor. 39 London Guarantee sued
the defendant school district to recover an amount retained
by the district pursuant to a per diem liquidated damages
clause in a contract for construction of an elementary
school.40 The trial court determined that all delay was the re-
sponsibility of the contractor and dismissed the complaint.41
The court of appeal agreed that the contractor caused all de-
lay.42 The court held that the district was justified in retain-
ing liquidated damages for the number of days the contractor
delayed substantial completion.43 The court of appeal cau-
tioned, however, that had the district caused some delay, the
decision in Gogo would have prevented the district from re-
covering liquidated damages: "If the trial court had found
that there was fault on the part of the school district it would
not have allowed the school district to retain any liquidated
damages."44 The Gogo rule was well on its way to entrench-
ment in California commercial contract law.
One must note, however, that throughout Gogo and the
cases that follow there is an overriding, implicit adherence to
the equitable maxim of "unclean hands." It has long been
true that in equity actions, "one who seeks equity must do
equity."45
As stated above, before the 1978 amendment to Civil
Code section 1671, California case law and legislation exhib-
ited a strong bias against liquidated damages provisions. 46
Liquidated damages were seen as an extraordinary remedy,
and appropriate only where the benefiting party deserved ex-
traordinary equitable relief.47 Gogo and its progeny manifest
38. 12 Cal. Rptr. 598, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 600.
43. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Las Lomitas Sch. Dist. of San Ma-
teo County, 12 Cal. Rptr. 598, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
44. Id. at 599.
45. See, e.g., Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d
472, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1969), and cases cited therein.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
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this bias against liquidated damages.4" As will be discussed
below, whether this bias will survive the amendment to sec-
tion 1671 remains uncertain.
2. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Pasadena City Junior
College District: The California Supreme
Court's Only Guidance
The next case to address the issue, and the only Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision to analyze the matter, was Peter
Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Pasadena City Junior College District.49
In Kiewit, the plaintiff contractor entered into a contract with
the defendant, a junior college district, for the construction of
school facilities. 0 Following late completion of the project,
the district withheld final payment based on a per diem liqui-
dated damages clause. 51 The trial court refused to allow the
district to retain any of the liquidated damages, after finding
that late completion was caused by matters beyond the con-
tractor's control, including the district's own conduct.5 2
Curiously, the California Supreme Court affirmed with-
out referencing Gogo. Rather, the court relied heavily on Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 1511(1), 5 1 which provides that "any
delay in the performance of an obligation 'is excused' when
performance is delayed by 'the act of the creditor ... even
though there may have been a stipulation that this shall not
be an excuse.' '5 4 The court determined that:
[A]n owner who is a party to a construction contract is a
creditor within the meaning of section 1511 . . . [and] in
the absence of a contractual provision for extensions of
time, the rule generally followed is that an owner is pre-
cluded from obtaining liquidated damages not only for
late completion caused entirely by him but also for a delay
48. See supra text accompanying notes 22-47 and infra text accompanying
notes 62-111.
49. 379 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1963).
50. Id. at 19.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 20.
53. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1511 (West 1982) (although this section was amended
in 1965, the amendment did not affect that part of the statute relied upon in
Kiewit).
54. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Pasadena City Junior College Dist., 379 P.2d
18, 20 (Cal. 1963) (quoting CAL. Crv. CODE § 1511 (1963)) (emphasis omitted).
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to which he has contributed, even though the contractor
has caused some or most of the delay.55
Much of what was added to the analysis in Kiewit has
been rendered obsolete by provisions that are now typically
included in construction contracts.5" The Kiewit contract did
not allow the owner to grant the contractor extensions of time
for completion.57 Construction contracts used today, however,
routinely provide that an owner shall grant extensions to the
agreed-upon substantial completion date where the owner (or
some other cause beyond the contractor's control) has delayed
the contractor's ability to perform pursuant to the stipulated
timetable. 58 Although section 1511 does not appear to explic-
itly limit itself to situations where the contract at issue lacks
such a provision, the California Supreme Court, in Kiewit,
clearly focused on this fact.59 While the court did not explic-
itly limit the application of section 1511 to cases in which the
contract had no provision for extensions of time, it is notable
that Kiewit is cited in substance in only one other case - a
case involving a construction contract lacking such a
provision. °
As stated above, the American Institute of Architects'
"General Conditions of the Contract for Construction," used
in our hypothetical, provide that the owner may grant the
contractor an extension where the contractor is delayed by
the owner's neglect.6 1 Thus, the issue today is not whether
the owner may grant such an extension, but whether the con-
tractor is entitled to an extension. As is the case in our hypo-
thetical, much of the litigation in this area involves situations
where an owner disputes that it caused any delay, disputes
that it should have granted such an extension, or contends
that any such delay either did not cause or was only a minor
cause of the contractor's failure to complete work under the
terms of the contract. Thus, in construction practice today,
Kiewit is the only California Supreme Court guidance on the
55. Id. at 20 (citing 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS 764 (3d ed. 1961)).
56. See supra text accompanying note 7.
57. Kiewit, 379 P.2d at 20-21.
58. See generally, JERVIS & LEVIN supra note 1.
59. Peter Kiewit Sons Co. v. Pasadena City Junior College Dist., 379 P.2d
18, 20 (Cal. 1963).
60. See General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970), and discussion infra part III.B.4.
61. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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issue, and Kiewit appears to be of little assistance in resolv-
ing the issues presented when both the owner and the con-
tractor contribute to the delay in completion of the project.
3. Aetna Casualty Co. v. Board of Trustees of Rincon
Valley Union School District: The Specter of
Actual Damages
The next case in the Gogo line is Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Board of Trustees of Rincon Valley Union School
District,6 2 where the defendant school district contracted
with the plaintiff contractor for the construction of an ele-
mentary school. The agreement contained a fifty-dollar per
diem liquidated damages provision. 3 The district withheld
liquidated damages for 125 days of delay, and the contractor
filed suit to recover that sum.64 The trial court determined
that although the contractor was somewhat "dilatory" in its
work habits, the district, by its own delay in processing
change orders and providing architectural drawings, ren-
dered performance by the contractor impossible within the
time agreed to by the parties. 5 The trial court found that the
district's neglect caused ninety-five days of delay.66 There-
fore, the court apportioned the liquidated damages, allowing
the district to retain liquidated damages for only thirty days
of delay.67
On appeal, the district contended, as does Owner in our
hypothetical, that since the contractor by its own conduct
would not have completed the project by the stipulated sub-
stantial completion date, the district should be allowed to re-
tain all liquidated damages, even though the district's con-
duct caused further delay.68
The court of appeal disagreed with the district, stating
that the test is whether the contractor could have completed
work on time given the delays caused by the district.69 After
determining that the contractor could not have completed the
62. 35 Cal. Rptr. 765 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
63. Id. at 766.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 767.
66. Id.
67. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Board. of Trustees of Rincon Valley
Union Sch. Dist., 35 Cal. Rptr. 765, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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work on time, the court of appeal reasoned as follows: "Liqui-
dated damages are a penalty not favored in equity and should
be enforced only after he who seeks to enforce them has
shown that he has strictly complied with the contractual req-
uisite to such enforcement."70 Based on this reasoning, the
court of appeal reversed the trial court's award of apportioned
liquidated damages, and ruled that the district was not enti-
tled to retain any liquidated damages whatsoever. 7 '
The holding in Aetna appears to be very favorable for
Contractor. Applying the court of appeal's test - whether
Contractor could have completed the work on time given the
delays caused by Owner7 2 - the conclusion would clearly be
negative. Due to the problems with the design, Contractor
could not have completed the work by January 1, 1995, even
if Contractor had performed in an exemplary manner. Under
Aetna, the fact that Contractor would still have finished late,
even in the absence of the inadequate drawings, appears ir-
relevant.7 3 According to the Aetna court, Owner would there-
fore be precluded from recovering any of the $2,700,000 in
liquidated damages.74 Unfortunately for Contractor, how-
ever, the Aetna decision may not be as favorable as it initially
appears. After refusing to apportion or award any liquidated
damages to the school district, the court proceeded to provide
that "[t]he District, of course, retains its right to show actual
damages sustained by the contractor's subsequent delays."75
In support of this proposition, the court of appeal quoted New
York Continental Jewell Filtration Co. v. United States:
It is well settled that in cases where delays have been
caused by both parties to a contract, and the completion of
the contract has thereby been extended beyond the time
fixed, the obligation for liquidated damages is annulled,
and it can not [sic] be revived, and any recovery for subse-
quent delays must be for actual loss proved to have been
sustained.76
70. Id. at 767.
71. Id. at 768.
72. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Board of Trustees of Rincon Valley
Union Sch. Dist., 35 Cal. Rptr. 765, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)
73. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
75. Aetna, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 768 (emphasis added).
76. Id. (quoting New York Continental Jewell Filtration Co. v. United
States, 55 Ct. Cl. 288 (1920)) (emphasis added by Aetna court).
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Thus, Aetna appears to hold that while an owner may not re-
cover liquidated damages if it causes or contributes to delay
in completion, it can still recover actual damages caused by
the contractor's delay.77 In our hypothetical case, this could
be disastrous for Contractor, because Owner may well be able
to prove actual damages in excess of what the parties had
agreed to as liquidated damages. It could also lead to the
anomalous situation of an owner seeking to invalidate a liqui-
dated damages clause because of its own "unclean hands," so
as to permit it to recover more in actual damages than it
could have recovered in liquidated damages. Neither Aetna
nor any other appellate decision since Aetna has discussed
further how actual damages should be calculated or awarded.
4. General Insurance Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House
The next case ostensibly following Gogo and Aetna and
refusing to apportion liquidated damages was General Insur-
ance Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House.78 Hyatt is the only case to
address an issue involving a purely private construction con-
tract.79 In Hyatt, the contractor's performance surety sued
Hyatt, the owner, to recover per diem liquidated damages re-
tained by Hyatt following the construction of a hotel.8 ° The
contractor completed the hotel seventy-one days after the
agreed-upon target date.8 '
During construction, the parties encountered a variety of
delays, including delays caused by various departments of
Los Angeles County and miscellaneous "acts of God."82 The
trial court found also that certain delays were caused by acts
attributable solely to Hyatt.83 The trial court held, accord-
ingly, that Hyatt was not entitled to retain any of the liqui-
dated damages.8 4
Thereafter, the court of appeal addressed the central is-
sue: "Is there substantial evidence in the instant record to
77. Id.
78. 85 Cal. Rptr. 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 319-20.
81. Id. at 320.
82. Id. ("Acts of God" include "general war or casualty beyond the control of
the contractor").
83. General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970).
84. Id. at 320.
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support the trial court's findings to the effect that the delay of
seventy-one days in the completion of construction resulted
from causes chargeable to the owners and that respondent
fully performed the contract except as lawfully excused from
performance?" 5
The court of appeal answered the question in the affirm-
ative.8 6 "[Elvidence tending to prove that construction would
have been fully completed prior to the completion date speci-
fied in the contract . . .had it not been for delays directly
chargeable to [Hyatt]" 7 persuaded the court that Hyatt was
responsible for the delay in completion.8 8 Under these cir-
cumstances, the court stated that "'[t]he rule generally fol-
lowed is that an owner is precluded from obtaining liquidated
damages not only for late completion caused entirely by him
but also for a delay to which he has contributed, even though
the contractor has caused some or most of the delay.'"8 9 The
court then observed, in equitable terms reminiscent of Gogo,
that:
An owner whose acts have contributed substantially to
the delayed performance of a construction contract may
not recover liquidated damages on the basis of such delay.
"Liquidated damages are a penalty not favored in equity
and should be enforced only after he who seeks to enforce
them has shown that he has strictly complied with the
contractual requisite to such enforcement."9 °
Although the Hyatt court cites to Gogo and Aetna
throughout its opinion, 91 the facts in Hyatt are markedly dis-
similar from those present in the cases upon which the court
relies.92 While the court appears to base its decision on Gogo's
pronouncement that "'where such delays are occasioned by
85. Id. at 322-23.
86. Id. at 323.
87. Id.
88. General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970).
89. Id. at 323-24 (quoting Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Pasadena City Junior
College Dist., 379 P.2d 18, 20-21) (Cal. 1963). The court added that this general
rule applies "'in the absence of a contractual provision for the extensions of time
... .'" Id. at 324 (quoting Kiewit, 379 P.2d at 21).
90. Id. at 325 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Board of Trustees of
Rincon Valley Union Sch. Dist., 35 Cal. Rptr. 765, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (cita-
tions omitted).
91. See id. at 325 and infra text accompanying note 93.
92. See generally supra text accompanying notes 22-77.
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the mutual fault of the parties the court will not attempt to
apportion them but will refuse to enforce the provision for liq-
uidated damages,'" there was no "mutual fault" in Hyatt.
9 3
This is not a case such as our hypothetical where Contractor,
already behind schedule, finished work even further behind
schedule because of additional delays caused by Owner.
Rather, the Hyatt court determined that the contractor would
have finished the project on time had it not been for Hyatt's
actions.94 Thus, contrary to the court's declarations, Hyatt
was not an apportionment case at all - there was nothing to
apportion.95
5. Vrgora v. Los Angeles Unified School District:
Resolving the Conflict?
The last case purporting to address whether to apportion
liquidated damages was Vrgora v. Los Angeles Unified School
District.96 Vrgora was an action arising from a construction
contractor's delay in completion of a school district's automo-
tive service facility.97 The trial court determined that the con-
tractor was liable for damages pursuant to a per diem liqui-
dated damages clause. 9s The agreement providing for
liquidated damages was entered into in January of 1977,
before the effective date of the amendment of Civil Code sec-
tion 1671. 99 The contractor contended that the district was
not entitled to liquidated damages because the delay was at-
tributable to the district's failure to warn the contractor of
anticipated difficulties in obtaining approval of the vehicle
performance testing machine by the City of Los Angeles. 100
The contractor further asserted that the district actually
used and occupied a portion of the facility prior to substantial
completion, therefore entitling the contractor to a set-off
against the liquidated damages. 10 The trial court disagreed,
93. General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970) (quoting Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 114
P.2d 65, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941)) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 325.
95. See generally id.
96. 200 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 132.
99. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
100. Id.
101. Vgora v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 200 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
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awarding the district the full amount of liquidated damages
after finding that "the subject delays were totally due to [the
contractor's] carelessness." o2
The court of appeal for the first time acknowledged that
the cases following Gogo may be in conflict with other deci-
sions regarding the propriety of apportioning liquidated dam-
ages. 10 3 Although the court of appeal determined that the
Gogo and Aetna line of cases was more "persuasive authority
against [an] apportionment argument in the context of a liq-
uidated damages dispute, such as ours,"10 4 the court rea-
soned that:
[I]t must be presumed that certain direct or indirect bene-
fits which might be enjoyed by the [District], even though
delay and breach were due to no fault of that party, were
considered by the contracting parties. Accordingly, it fol-
lows that in agreeing to the liquidated damages provision
in the subject contract, [the contractor] "bargained away"
any offsetting claim he may have had for [the District's]
unjust enrichment at his expense.10 5
The court concluded that the contractor was the "sole source
of any delays and thus was obligated under the terms of the
contract for the agreed liquidated damages."1 0 6 Although the
Vrgora court addressed the "apportionment argument," this
case, like Hyatt, was not an apportionment case. Because the
contractor was responsible for all delay, the contractor was
responsible for all liquidated damages and, as in Hyatt, there
was nothing to apportion. 0 7 The Vrgora appellate court pur-
ported to reconcile the conflict existing in the case law.'08
However, its determination that Gogo and its progeny are
more persuasive was irrelevant to the facts at issue in the
102. Id.
103. The court cited Gogo v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 114
P.2d 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) and London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Las
Lomitas Sch. Dist. of San Mateo County, 12 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)
for the proposition that liquidated damages will not be apportioned; and Jasper
Constr., Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist., 153 Cal. Rptr. 767, 775 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) for the proposition that liquidated damages may be apportioned
based upon comparative fault for delay. Id. at 135 n.6. See also infra text accom-
panying notes 148-160 for discussion of Jasper.
104. Vrgora, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
105. Id. at 136.
106. Vgora v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 200 Cal. Rptr. 130, 136 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
107. Id. at 136.
108. Id. at 135-36.
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case before it. 109 This implicit finding of irrelevance is further
exemplified by the fact that the court, while ostensibly follow-
ing Gogo and Aetna, in refusing to apportion liquidated dam-
ages, allowed the owner to retain all liquidated damages. 110
In Gogo and Aetna, the courts similarly refused to apportion
liquidated damages, but ordered that the owner could not re-
cover any liquidated damages."'
C. Are the Cases Refusing to Apportion Liquidated
Damages Still Valid Precedent?
No California appellate decision refusing to apportion
liquidated damages has ever been overruled. Nonetheless,
the precedential value of these cases is questionable for a va-
riety of reasons.
Initially, one must note that there is no reported decision
of a California court that was asked to apportion liquidated
damages under a construction contract signed after the 1978
amendment to Civil Code section 1671. All of the decisions
adjudicating this issue have involved contractual provisions
governed either by pre-amendment Civil Code section 1671
or, as will be further discussed, by California Government
Code section 14376.112 As discussed above, pre-amendment
section 1671 declared that liquidated damages were void ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances. 1 13 Gogo, ordained by
Vrgora as the more "persuasive authority,"" 4 and Gogo's
progeny, all started from the proposition that the law disfa-
vors liquidated damages." 5 These courts were thus reluctant
to enforce a disfavored contractual provision on behalf of an
owner whose own "unclean hands" had hindered the contrac-
tor's ability to timely complete construction. 1 16
The 1978 Amendment to section 1671 completely altered
the attitude toward liquidated damages. 1 17 As stated above,
the amended provision now espouses a legislative preference
109. Id.
110. Id. at 136.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 22-77.
112. See infra note 160.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
114. Vrgora v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 200 Cal. Rptr. 130, 136 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
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for liquidated damages.11 Thus, the "unclean hands" analy-
sis of Gogo, London Guarantee, Aetna and, in part, Hyatt, ap-
pears no longer to be dispositive. The pronouncement, for ex-
ample, by the Hyatt court (citing Gogo and Aetna as
authority) that "liquidated damages are a penalty not favored
in equity,"119 is no longer true. Since 1978, judicial enforce-
ment of liquidated damages is favored. 120 Unfortunately,
whether this change in attitude will result in apportionment
of such damages based on comparative fault has not been
adjudicated.
The second reason courts refused to apportion liquidated
damages was the absence of contractual provisions for exten-
sions of time.12 It is now common in the industry, and is part
of the American Institute of Architects' "General Conditions
of the Contract for Construction," to provide explicitly that
the owner may grant the contractor extensions for delay
caused by the owner. 122 Current construction delay litigation
seldom involves the issue of whether an owner could have
granted a contractor an extension of time. Therefore, this jus-
tification for refusing apportionment seems no longer
pertinent.
The final reason courts refused to apportion liquidated
damages was based on the perception that "'[t]here is no way
for summing up the defaults of each and apportioning the
damages to them . ,,"'12 As will be discussed below, how-
ever, more recent decisions thoroughly rebuff the view that
fault cannot be segregated, calling apportionment "an uncom-
plicated fact finding process," and stating "[t]hat is what
courts are for."1 24 In our hypothetical, as is common in cur-
rent construction litigation, scheduling and delay experts are
fully capable of apportioning quantum of delay, making it
118. See supra text accompanying note 15.
119. General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal. Rptr. 317, 325 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970) (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Board of Trustees of Rin-
con Valley Union Sch. Dist., 35 Cal. Rptr. 765, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)).
120. See supra text accompanying note 15.
121. See cases cited supra notes 49, 78 and accompanying text.
122. See AMERICAN INST. ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CON-
TRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, § 8.3.1, at 13 (1976).
123. Gogo v. Los Angeles Flood Control Dist., 114 P.2d 65, 71 (Cal. Ct. App.
1941)(quoting Champlain Constr. Co. v. O'Brien, 117 F. 271, 277 (C.C.D.Vt.
1902)).
124. Nomellini Constr Co. v. California Dep't of Water Resources, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 682, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
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rather unlikely that the court will conclude that in such cases
there is "no way for summing up the defaults of each and ap-
portioning the damages to them."125 For these reasons, the
precedential value of the line of cases refusing to apportion
liquidated damages is suspect. If the courts now choose to ap-
portion liquidated damages, what becomes of the holding in
Aetna, which authorizes the owner's recovery of actual dam-
ages in lieu of liquidated damages? 126
Although Aetna is frequently cited for its refusal to ap-
portion liquidated damages, 127 it is the only California case to
discuss the viability of a claim for actual damages where liq-
uidated damages have been disallowed. One reason for the
dearth of analysis in this area could be that in most cases the
owner suffers only a small amount of actual damages, if any,
relative to the liquidated damages at stake. A second reason
could be that courts addressing liquidated damages provi-
sions before the 1978 amendment simply voided the clause
summarily, thus precluding any subsequent appellate
analysis.
Whatever the reason, Aetna is the only California au-
thority allowing an owner to recover actual damages when
that owner is prohibited from recovering liquidated damages
because it had contributed to the delay in completion. One
could argue that Aetna makes sense in that an owner should
not be without some remedy if a contractor had admittedly
caused delay in completion of the project. In cases such as
our hypothetical, however, the approach envisioned by Aetna
would be inequitable to Contractor. It would expose Contrac-
tor to actual damages well in excess of what Contractor had
bargained for when it agreed to a completion date and the
specified amount of liquidated damages should it fail to meet
that completion date. The way to avoid these problems, it
seems, is to abandon the "all or nothing" rule of Gogo128 and
permit the apportionment of liquidated damages. Cases
adopting this approach are discussed below.
125. Gogo, 114 P.2d at 71 (quoting Champlain Constr. Co. v. O'Brien, 117 F.
271, 277 (C.C.D.Vt. 1902)).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 62-77.
127. See, e.g., Bilardi Construction Inc., v. Spencer, 86 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970); General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal. Rptr. 317,
325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
128. See generally Gogo v. Los Angeles Flood Control Dist., 114 P.2d 65 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1941).
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D. California Decisions Apportioning Liquidated Damages
Based on Comparative Fault
1. Nomellini Construction Co. v. California
Department of Water Resources: The New
Model?
The first California case allowing apportionment of liqui-
dated damages was Nomellini Construction Co. v. California
Department of Water Resources.'29 In Nomellini, the contrac-
tor sued the Department of Water Resources to recover liqui-
dated damages withheld by the department following delayed
completion. 130 The contractor argued that the department
had delayed construction by failing to approve shop drawings
within the time required by the contract.13' The trial court
agreed and held that the department was not entitled, there-
fore, to retain any liquidated damages. 132
The court of appeal framed the issues in the following
manner: "(1) Was [the contractor] or the Department or both
responsible for delays attendant to the approval of certain
shop drawings? (2) If some of the delay was the responsibility
of each party, was the Department properly deprived of all
liquidated damages?" 33
With regard to the first issue, the appellate court dis-
agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the department
was responsible for some delay.' It held that either all de-
lays were caused by the contractor or, for any delays arguably
not the contractor's responsibility, the department properly
granted extensions of time pursuant to an extension provi-
sion in the contract.' 35 However, the court went on to address
the second issue: "Assuming arguendo contrary to our hold-
ing that there were delays which the Department should
have allowed, they were delays which the trial court would
have been obligated to apportion."1 36
129. 96 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
130. Id. at 683.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 684.
133. Id. at 683.
134. Nomellini Const. Co. v. California Dep't of Water Resources, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 682, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
135. Id. at 685.
136. Id.
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The court of appeal found the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Robinson v. United States137 persuasive.
Robinson involved a contract that provided for both liqui-
dated damages and extensions of time. 13s The work was not
completed on time.' 39 The government acknowledged that it
had caused a portion of the delay in completion.140 The
United States Supreme Court held that simply because the
government caused some delay, the delay presented no legal
ground for denying compensation for other loss suffered
wholly through the fault of the contractor.' 41
Since the contractor agreed to pay at a specified rate for
each day's delay not caused by the Government, it was
clearly the intention that it should pay for some days' de-
lay at that rate, even if it were relieved from paying for
other days, because of the Government's action. 142
The Nomellini court of appeal also found persuasive the
pronouncement of Professor Williston:
In building contracts, there is often inserted a provision
giving the architect power to certify an extension of time
in certain cases, by virtue of which the effect of a delay
caused by the owner operates merely as an extension of
time of performance, and a new time is substituted for the
old. In that event though the owner causes delay the
builder is liable in liquidated damages, but the period of
delay caused by the owner is deducted from the total de-
lay. Unless the contract contains such a provision the de-
lay due to each party will not generally be apportioned. 143
The Nomellini court found most significant, though, Gov-
ernment Code section 14376's requirement that every public
works contract contain a liquidated damages provision speci-
fying the following: "[A] provision in regard to the time when
the ... portion of the work contemplated shall be completed,
[providing] that for each day completion is delayed beyond
the specified time, the contractor shall forfeit and pay the
137. 261 U.S. 486 (1923).
138. Id. at 487-88.
139. Id. at 487.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 488.
142. Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. 486, 488 (1923).
143. Nomellini Constr. Co. v. California Dep't of Water Resources, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 682, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (citing 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, ON CONRrACTS
764-66 (3d ed. 1961)).
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State a specified sum of money ... ."44 The court observed
that "Gogo ... cases which have followed it have either in-
volved contracts devoid of extension provisions or contracts
between private parties... and when it was said: 'Liquidated
damages are a penalty not favored in equity ... ,.4 How-
ever, in public contracts, the court noted, provisions for liqui-
dated damages "are not only favored, they are expressly com-
manded by Government Code section 14376 ." 146 The court
further reasoned that:
[C]ategorical statements [such as those made in Gogo]
that where delays are caused on both sides there is no
way to "apportion damages" are an absurdity. Damages
are not being apportioned. Damages are liquidated.
Quantum of delay in terms of time is all that is being ap-
portioned. That is an uncomplicated fact finding process.
That is what courts are for.14
7
2. Jasper Construction, Inc. v. Foothill Junior College
District: A Move Toward Apportionment
Nomellini was followed closely by Jasper Construction,
Inc. v. Foothill Junior College District, 48 in which the plain-
tiff contractor sued a junior college district for damages for
breach of contract resulting from alleged defects in plans and
specifications for the construction of an auditorium. 14 The
essence of the contractor's claim was that as a result of inade-
quate and defective plans and specifications for the construc-
tion of the project and negligence in construction administra-
tion, the contractor suffered delays and extra expenses. 150
The district cross-claimed for per diem liquidated damages
for 363 days of delay, as provided for in the contract.' 5 ' The
parties had signed the contract in 1968, before the amend-
ment of Civil Code section 1671.152 The trial court held in
144. Id. at 684.
145. Id. at 686 (quoting General Ins. Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 317, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 153 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
149. Id. at 769.
150. Id. at 770.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 769.
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favor of plaintiff on all its claims and denied the district's
cross-claim for liquidated damages. 1
53
The court of appeal observed, however, a "major error" in
the following jury instruction given by the trial court: "If you
find that any delay on the project was caused by Defendant
Foothill or its agents, then Defendant Foothill may not with-
hold any liquidated delay damages from Plaintiff Jasper, and
you may not apportion the liquidated delay damages between
these parties."" 4 This instruction was coupled with a jury in-
struction that if the contractor proved "by a preponderance of
the evidence" that the district was responsible for "'some of
the delay' that prevented completion of the project within the
official time, [then the district] was not entitled to any liqui-
dated damages."155
The court of appeal stated that the trial court's instruc-
tions "were based on the rules set forth in Gogo... and Aetna
.... both of which held that where both parties are responsi-
ble for delay of the project, the court will not attempt to ap-
portion the delay, but the entire liquidated damages clause
will be unenforceable."15 6 The court of appeal stated, how-
ever, that in each of those cases, "the contract did not evince
an intent that liquidated damages could be assessed even
where delay was caused by both parties," because the con-
tracts at issue were lacking provisions for extensions of
time. 157 The court observed that the contract between Jasper
and Foothill not only contained a provision for extensions of
time by the owner, but also specifically provided that liqui-
dated damages would not be assessed "when the delay in
completion of the work is due .... [t]o unforeseeable cause
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the
Contractor, including.., acts of the Owner ....,l8
The court of appeal found Robinson and Nomellini con-
trolling, and cited Professor Williston for the general rule
that "where a building contract contains provisions for exten-
sions of time from the owner, the effect of owner-caused delay
153. Jasper Constr., Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist., 153 Cal. Rptr. 767,
770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
154. Id. at 774.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Jasper Constr., Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist., 153 Cal. Rptr. 767,
774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (emphasis added) (text omitted by the court of appeal).
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will operate merely as an extension of time and the builder
will still be liable in liquidated damages for delay caused on
his own part."159
The court of appeal held that the apportionment rule set
forth in Nomellini and Robinson applied, "... both because
the contract contained an explicit provision allowing appor-
tionment and because the 'all or none' rule of Gogo and Aetna
is based upon the principle that liquidated damages are disfa-
vored by the law."160
E. The Precedential Value of Cases Apportioning
Liquidated Damages Based on Comparative Delay
Only two California courts have held that liquidated
damages may be apportioned: Nomellini16 1 and Jasper.62
The precedential value of these two cases at first appears
somewhat tenuous. Both cases involve pre-1978 liquidated
damages provisions. 16' Further, Nomellini's discussion of the
issue is pure dicta, and Jasper does little more than merely
incorporate this dicta without adding any real analysis to the
159. Id. (citing 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS 764-66 (3d ed. 1961)).
160. Id. The Jasper appellate court offered a third justification for the appli-
cation of the apportionment rule, stating that the "all or none" principal of Gogo
and Aetna "does not apply to public contracts, in which provisions for liquidated
damages are expressly authorized by statute." Id. (citing Nomellini Constr. Co.
v. California Dep't of Water Resources, 96 Cal. Rptr. 682, 686 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14276 (repealed by stat. 1981) (West 1992). The court
did not explain why the contract between Foothill and Jasper should be consid-
ered a "public contract," and therefore why Government Code § 14376 would be
applicable. Id. While defendant Foothill was a school district, the defendants in
London Guarantee, Kiewit, and Aetna were also school districts, and the defend-
ant in Gogo was a flood control district. See supra notes 10-77. Further, Govern-
ment Code § 14376 was enacted initially in 1945, four years after Gogo, but
before all other decisions in this area. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 14376 (repealed by
stat. 1981) (West 1992). Finally, "public works" was not defined until the enact-
ment of Government Code § 2600 in 1981, now codified as Public Contract Code
§ 22200. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 22000 (West Supp. 1992). Section 22200 pro-
vides that a "'public works contract' means ... a contract awarded through
competitive bids or otherwise by the state, any of its political subdivisions or
public agencies for the erection, construction, alteration, repair, or improve-
ment of any kind upon real property." Id. As this definition was not codified
until two years after the adjudication in Jasper, it is unlikely that a change in
the judicial understanding of a public contract could be responsible for the Jas-
per court's seemingly inconsistent finding. Thus, it is unclear why the Jasper
court believed this third justification was relevant.
161. Nomellini, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
162. Jasper, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
163. Nomellini, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 683. See also supra text accompanying note
159.
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issue. 164 However, the analysis set forth in Nomellini, fol-
lowed by Jasper,"'6 may be more applicable to post-1978 con-
tracts, such as the contract in our hypothetical, than any
other decision. Nomellini was decided pursuant to the pre-
sumption that liquidated damages provisions are valid, 66
rather than under the old presumption that disfavored liqui-
dated damages. 167
The contract at issue in Nomellini was decided under
Government Code section 14376, under which per diem liqui-
dated damages "are not only favored, they are expressly com-
manded .... - 6 s Thus, the court was not confined by equita-
ble "unclean hands" maxims, which have since been rendered
questionable by the 1978 amendment to section 1671.169
While other courts were reluctant to enforce a presumably in-
valid contractual provision in favor of a party not completely
deserving of such "extraordinary" equitable relief, this was
not a concern in Nomellini, where the liquidated damages
clause was drafted pursuant to a statute expressly favoring
its existence. 170 Such is the case in all post-1978 contracts.
Thus, the post-1978 liquidated damages provision between
Owner and Contractor is presumed valid, and, in the absence
of precedent so stating, logic dictates that apportioning fault
and, therefore, liquidated damages between the parties is the
better view - one that courts and construction contractees
alike should adopt wholeheartedly.
Today, it is clear that the "all or none" rule is antiquated
and should give way to the more just and equitable approach
of apportioning liquidated damages for delay based on rela-
tive comparative fault. Parties agree to liquidated damages
when drafting a construction contract for one reason - to es-
timate and allocate risks, thereby minimizing economic un-
certainty. They choose a liquidated damages amount that will
be fair and that will reasonably compensate the injured party
in the event that the contract is not performed in the manner
164. See Jasper Constr., Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist., 153 Cal. Rptr.
767, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
165. Id.
166. Nomellini Constr. Co. v. California Dep't of Water Resources, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 682, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
168. Nomellini, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15, 45-48.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15, 45-48.
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envisioned at its making. Refusing to apportion liquidated
damages, and archaic adherence to the "all or none" rule, ut-
terly vitiates the intentions of the parties at the time of the
making and performance of the contract. It is unfair and in-
appropriate to expose a contractor - who agreed to a liqui-
dated damages provision so as to quantify its economic down-
side - to liability for actual damages. These actual damages
could be far in excess of the liquidated damages estimated by
the parties, simply because the owner was partially at fault
and is thus unable, under the "all or none" rule, to recover
liquidated damages. The "all or none" rule makes it possible
for an owner with "unclean hands" to recover more in actual
damages than could have been recovered in liquidated dam-
ages had the owner's hands remained clean.
Similarly, an owner, who has agreed to liquidated dam-
ages in an effort to protect itself in the event that the contrac-
tor cannot timely perform, can be exposed to unfair and ineq-
uitable outcomes due to the capricious application of the "all
or none" rule. Is it equitable that an owner with minimal ac-
tual damages should be deprived of the entirety of the actual
damages - for which it bargained at the time of the making
of the contract - simply because, for example, the owner is
responsible for only one out of one hundred days of delay?
California courts adjudicating matters in tort law have long
since eliminated the contributory negligence rule, which
would bar an injured and deserving plaintiff from any recov-
ery where that plaintiff was as little as one percent at
fault.171 Logic and reason dictate that the "all or none" rule,
set forth in 1941 by the Gogo court, 172 should now similarly
give way to the more progressive and equitable rule allowing
apportionment of liquidated damages for delay based on com-
parative fault.
Though no case has ever overruled Gogo or any of its
progeny, the logic upon which those cases was based has cer-
tainly withered substantially, and an owner or contractor
favoring apportionment should argue accordingly. No longer
are courts restricted in their ability to determine and appor-
tion fault in a construction-delay context. Construction litiga-
171. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1975) (where con-
tributory negligence is no longer a bar to recovery and damages are apportioned
in relation to the percentage contribution).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 22-37.
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tion experts and consultants who can apportion construction-
delay responsibility are commonplace. 173 It is no longer spec-
ulative to articulate the percentage of comparative fault of an
owner/developer and contractor. 174 No longer should the "all
or nothing" approach of Gogo and its progeny be the only
available option.
F. Foreign Appellate Analysis and Commentary
Despite the reluctance of California appellate courts to
apportion liquidated damages, this remedy has not been a
problem for a number of courts in foreign jurisdictions. 175 For
example, in E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Construction Co. of
Texas,'76 the court sitting in diversity jurisdiction analyzed
the issue under Alabama law. 177 The case involved a series of
disputes between, among others, Ernst, a subcontractor reno-
vating a hospital, and Providence Hospital, the project
owner.' 7 8 The contract between the two called for per diem
liquidated damages.' 79 Work was completed behind schedule,
and evidence suggested that both Ernst and Providence were
partially responsible for the delay. 180 Although Alabama
courts had previously adjudicated matters concerning appor-
tionment of actual damages,"'' this was the first case under
Alabama law to address the propriety of apportioning liqui-
dated damages based on comparative fault.'8 2
Ernst argued that Providence should be precluded from
recovering any liquidated damages based on "the so-called
173. See generally JERVIS & LEVIN, supra note 1.
174. See id.
175. For a further discussion of apportionment of liquidated damages based
on mutual fault in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., 1 CONSTRUCTION LAw CON.
TRACTS AND DISPUTES PROGRAM HANDBOOK 116-18 (CEB 1989); JERVIS & LEVIN,
supra note 1, § 7.18.
176. 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied in part, reh'g granted in
part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977), and cert. denied, sub nom., Providence Hosp.
v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
177. Id. at 1028, 1029 n.1.
178. Id. at 1028.
179. Id. at 1031.
180. Id. at 1029-30.
181. See, e.g., Kershaw Mining Co. v. Lankford, 105 So. 896 (Ala. 1925).
182. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026, 1038
(5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied in part, reh'g granted in part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir. 1977), and cert. denied, sub nom., Providence Hosp. v. Manhattan Constr.
Co., 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
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rule against apportionment."1 8 3 According to the court, the
rule against apportionment provides that "under a liquidated
damage provision against delay, where the owner has con-
tributed to delays on the project he may not apportion the
fault but forfeits all right to recover under the provision."8 4
The court observed, however, that the rule against ap-
portionment "is an old one whose underlying policies do not
remain in full force.""8 5 The court noted that "[o]ne of the
dominant reasons underlying it is early judicial hostility to
the use of privately agreed upon contract damage reme-
dies."1 86 The court acknowledged that "[t]oday, given the in-
creasing complexity of contractual relations, liquidated dam-
age provisions have obtained fair judicial and legislative
support."8 v The court of appeals held accordingly that Ala-
bama law permitted apportionment of fault.18 8 "As long as
the owner's delay is not incurred in bad faith, it is not unjust
to allow proportional fault to govern recovery. Generally,
owners do not benefit from delays that they incur."8 9 The
court acknowledged that allocating fault to the respective
parties may be a complicated factual determination, "but re-
covery should not be barred in every case by a rule of law that
precludes examination of the evidence."190
Similarly, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Butte-Meade
Sanitary Water District,'9' a case decided under South Da-
kota law, the plaintiff, a bonding agent for the contractor,
filed suit against the defendant water district to recover pay-
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1038-39. The court cited to Mosler Safe Co. v. Maiden Lane Safe
Deposit Co., 93 N.E. 81 (N.Y. 1910), which observed that "[w]hile such an agree-
ment has not the harshness of a penalty, it is, nevertheless, in its nature, such
that its enforcement, where the party claiming the right to enforce has, in part,
been the cause of delay, would be unjust." Ernst, 551 F.2d at 1039.
187. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026, 1039
(5th Cir. 1977) reh'g denied in part, reh'g granted in part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.
1977), and cert. denied, sub nom., Providence Hosp. v. Manhattan Constr. Co.,
434 U.S. 1067 (1978). See also Otinger v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd.,
177 So. 2d 320 (Ala. 1965), and ALA. CODE § 2-718 (1966 Recomp.).
188. Ernst, 551 F.2d at 1039.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court observed that "[i]ncreasingly the courts are apportioning
fault in negligence cases by application of rules of comparative negligence." Id.
at 1039 n.34.
191. 500 F. Supp. 193 (D.S.D. 1980).
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ments retained by the district under two construction con-
tracts between the parties.192 The district counter-claimed
against plaintiff for $56,900 in liquidated damages under one
contract, and $65,050 in liquidated damages under the
other. 193
In Butte-Meade, the parties had contracted to complete
certain work on water mains and a pump house by an agreed-
upon date.19 4 Each contract provided for per diem liquidated
damages of fifty dollars. 195 The water main contract was com-
pleted 1,138 days late, and the pump house contract was com-
pleted 1,301 days late. 196 The court found that the district
and the contractor each were "at least in part responsible for
delaying the completion of the project."19v As such, plaintiff
argued that the district was barred from recovering any liqui-
dated damages:
By the weight of authority, where the contractee has
caused a substantial delay in the beginning or progress of
the work, without any agreement for an extension of time
to offset the delay, the time limit fixed in the contract, and
any provision for liquidated damages based thereon, are
entirely abrogated, leaving the contractor responsible only
for the completion of the work within a reasonable
time.19 8
The court disagreed: "[T]his Court feels that recent case
law is clearly in favor of such apportionment of fault and that
simply because [the district] contributed to the delay in the
completion of the project, it should not be barred from recov-
ering liquidated damages." 199 Referring to Robinson,2 °° the
court stated that "where the causes for delay can be appor-
tioned, the court is free to assess liquidated damages on this
basis, unless the court finds that the contract would have
been completed on time but for the delays caused by the party
192. Id. at 194.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Butte-Meade Sanitary Water Dist., 500
F. Supp. 193, 194 (D.S.D. 1980).
197. Id. at 197.
198. Id. at 194-95 (citing J.E. Macy, Annotation, Building Contract - Liqui-
dated Damages, 152 A.L.R. 1349, 1359 (1944)).
199. Id. at 197.
200. Robinson v. United States, 261 U.S. 486 (1923). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 137-42.
19931
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claiming liquidated damages."201 Accordingly, the court
awarded the district apportioned liquidated damages.2 °2
Finally, state and federal courts in several other jurisdic-
tions, including courts in Texas,2 °3 New York,2 °4 and Illi-
nois,2 01 have found apportionment of liquidated damages
based on mutual fault to be proper.20 6
201. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Butte-Meade Sanitary Water Dist., 500
F. Supp. 193, 196 (D.S.D. 1980) (citing Robinson, 261 U.S. at 488-89). See also
Nomellini Constr. Co. v. California Dep't of Water Resources, 96 Cal. Rptr. 682,
686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)).
202. Aetna, 500 F. Supp. at 197.
203. See Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Bd. v. Combustion Equip.
Ass'n, Inc., 623 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (5th Cir. 1980) (where court appears to
agree that apportionment is proper, but remands due to inconsistent jury an-
swers to interrogatories on issue of apportionment).
204. See Brecher v. Laikin, 430 F. Supp. 103, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (where
court discusses validity of liquidated damages).
205. See United States ex rel. Thorleif Larsen & Sons, Inc. v. B.R. Abbott
Constr. Co., 466 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1972) (court found apportionment of
damages by lower court appropriate).
206. Nonetheless, a number of jurisdictions do still cling to the rule against
apportionment. See, e.g., Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d
509, 535 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1965) (if "delays
are caused by both parties to the contract, the court will not attempt to appor-
tion them, but will simply hold that the provisions of the contract with refer-
ence to liquidated damages will be annulled."); United States v. Kanter, 137
F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1943) ("[I]t is also established that where one seeking to
enforce a provision for liquidated damages is responsible for the failure of per-
formance, or has contributed in part to it, the provision will not be enforced.");
Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Brumbaugh, 168 F. 867, 875 (4th Cir. 1909) ("[T]he courts
have laid down a very salutary rule to the effect that they will not attempt to
apportion such delays where the causes there of have been mutual, but will
refuse under such circumstances to enforce the penalty."); Glassman Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Maryland City Plaza, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 1154, 1161 (D.Md. 1974)
("Where one who is seeking to enforce a liquidated damages provision of a con-
tract is responsible for the failure to perform or has contributed in part to it, the
liquidated damages provision will not be enforced."); White Hall v. Southern
Mechanical Contracting, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (City
unable to recover liquidated damages where it contributed to delay); State v.
Jack B. Parson Constr., 456 P.2d 762, 764 (Idaho 1959); Haggerty v. Selsco, 534
P.2d 874 (Mont. 1974) (where "contractee caused a substantial part of the de-
lay" liquidated damages where denied); L.A. Reynolds Co. v. State Highway
Comm., 155 S.E.2d 473, 482 (N.C. 1967) (contractor not liable where "delays in
[the contract's] completion [was] occasioned by mutual defaults . . . ."); Lee
Turzillo Contracting Co. v. Frank Messer & Sons, Inc., 261 N.E.2d 675, 679
(Ohio Ct. App. 1969) ("[Wlhere an owner and a contractor are each responsible
for a certain amount of unreasonable delay in completing the work, the owner is
barred from assessing the contractor with liquidated damages for whatever de-
lay might have occurred in the completion of the work."). See also J.E. Macy,
Annotation, Building Contract - Liquidated Damages, 152 A.L.R. 1349, 1359-
78 (1944).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Owners and contractors agree to liquidated damages as a
reasonable manner in which to provide some certainty re-
garding the amount of damages in the event of construction
delays. 20 7 California courts can no longer be excused from ap-
portioning and awarding liquidated damages based on com-
parative fault simply by reference to the "unclean hands" of
one of the parties, or by their own perceived inability to affix
fault accordingly. Considering all judicial and legislative de-
velopments since Gogo and its progeny, logic and persuasion
dictate only one conclusion: In the event that both the owner
and contractor contribute to the delay in completion, liqui-
dated damages should be apportioned according to the par-
ties' comparative fault. Gogo and its progeny should now be
overruled. Until they are, however, owners and contractors
may wish to avoid the uncertainty in the law by specifically
agreeing in their construction contract that per diem liqui-
dated damages shall be apportioned where both parties con-
tribute to late completion of the project, and thus insulate
themselves from the archaic and arbitrary bite of the "all or
none" judicial approach.
207. See generally B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, §§ 528-42 (9th
ed. 1987).
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